If the investment budget is limited, not all profitable projects can be realized. Then the principal desires the agent to select the NPV-maximizing set of projects. Residual income does not solve this problem if the agent is impatient. Even the relative benefit cost allocation scheme proposed by Rogerson does not provide a solution. In this paper we show how this goal can be achieved under the same information structure as in Rogerson (1997) or Reichelstein (1997) . The result can be interpreted as an annuity benefit cost allocation scheme. Periodic shifts of the cash flows are used, which lead to a performance measure reflecting the NPV-ranking in each period.
Introduction
In many principal agent relationships the agent decides about investments because he is better informed about the investment opportunities. Thus, the principal's aim is to achieve goal congruence between his selection of projects and the agent's. Accordingly, the principal's objective is to motivate the agent to accept projects with an expected positive net present value (NPV ) to maximize the value of the investment portfolio. This special delegation relationship has been an important research field in recent years (Reichelstein, 1997 and 2000; Reichelstein and Dutta, 1999a and also 2002 Wagenhofer, 1999; Dutta, 2003) .
It is well known that this problem can be solved by introducing residual income as a performance measure, because the present value of residual incomes over a project's entire life can be shown to equal the NPV (Preinreich, 1937 and 1938; Lücke, 1955) . This consistency property is called "weak" goal congruence (Baldenius, Fuhrmann and Reichelstein, 1999:54) . Even if the investment budget is limited, residual income achieves goal congruence as long as agent and principal have the same planning horizon and use identical discount rates. In this case the desired NPV-maximizing projects will be selected. What drives this result, is the consistency with the NPV. In the case of an unlimited budget all projects with an ex ante expected positive NPV will be undertaken. In the case of a constrained budget the agent ranks the projects in the same way as the NPV does. The only condition that has to be satisfied, is that the agent receives a constant share of all residual incomes.
Consequently, the present value of his bonuses for any project is the same constant portion of each project's NPV. Therefore he ranks the projects in the same way as the NPV does and selects the NPV -maximizing investment portfolio.
But often the agent is myopic, i.e. he has a shorter time horizon or uses a higher discount rate. In an extreme case an impatient agent might just look at the next period's outcome. Due to the fact that the principal does not know how impatient his agent is, periodic consistency between the performance measure of any period and the NPV is necessary. For this purpose the relative benefit cost allocation scheme as established by Rogerson (1997) provides a specific solution. He finds an allocation rule for the investment costs, resulting in all expected residual incomes of a project having the same sign as the expected NPV. This property is called "strong" goal congruence (Baldenius, Fuhrmann and Reichelstein, 1999:55,58-60) . In addition Reichelstein (1997) If, however, the investment budget is constrained, which is often the case, not all profitable projects can be undertaken. The agent has to select a subset of the possible projects. But if he has a shorter time horizon than the life span of the longest project or a higher discount rate than the principal, his project selection might not be NPV -maximizing. We demonstrate by using a counterexample that the relative benefit cost allocation scheme fails to achieve goal congruence in this case. It follows, that strong goal congruence generally does not induce the NPV -maximizing investment selection. The principal seeks to design a performance measure which creates goal congruence in a way, that the agent should have an incentive to select the NPV -maximizing portfolio of investment projects. Accordingly, our aim is to create a perfect goal congruent performance measure:
1 In each period the ranking of projects by the performance measure residual income is identical to the ranking by NPV.
In this paper we establish an allocation rule of cash flows, which obtains a stronger goal congruence between the agent and the principal. We need a performance measure, which ensures that it is optimal for the agent to select the NPV -maximizing portfolio. Hence, we have to ensure periodic consistency between the performance measure and the NPV -rankings.
This means, if a project has a higher NPV than another, the residual incomes of the more profitable project exceed those of the less profitable one in every period. The idea behind our solution is, that there exists an allocation of the residual incomes over a project's lifetime, which guarantees that the agent chooses the NPV-maximizing investment portfolio even if he looks only at a single period. For this purpose we look for an allocation rule which "transfers" cash flows into accruals so that different projects are comparable. The determination of accruals, that means the determination of the asset base and the allocation of benefits and costs, remains crucial for the consistency between the performance measure and NPV -rankings. We show that perfect goal congruence can be reached by using an annuity benefit cost allocation scheme. The corresponding periodic shifts of the cash flows can be interpreted as provisions or as receivables. Consequently our annuity benefit cost allocation scheme allows a comparison of different projects, even if just one period is considered. At last, it is very important to mention, that we 1 Yet, Egginton (1995) required this kind of periodic consistency, a consistency between individual ex ante residual incomes and NPV s. He finds a depreciation method, that achieves periodic consistency for projects with equal life. But to reach this, he needs so much information, that the NPV itself could be used. Therefore he argues, that residual income does not satisfy the desired requirements. now use the same information structure as Rogerson (1997 ) or Reichelstein (1997 to achieve this goal.
Our performance measure leads us to a wider and more realistic field of application. So far it was only possible to motivate the agent to accept all projects with a positive NPV. Here we establish a performance measure inducing the optimal selection of investment projects, that the NPV will be maximized. This is necessary in the very realistic case of a limited investment budget or for alternative project decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we shortly describe the results by Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997) and demonstrate that they are not sufficient to achieve the NPV-maximizing project selection. In section 3 a solution for these limitations is developed by using a special allocation rule for accruals, the "perfect" and the "annuity" benefit cost allocation scheme which attain perfect goal congruence. Our findings are summarized in section 4.
Recent results and their limits 2.1 The model
We analyze the following situation. An owner (principal) delegates his investment decisions to a better informed manager (agent). In t = 0 the agent decides about the realization of investment projects. A possible project P i ∈ P can be described by P i = (a i, c 1i , c 2i , . . . c ni ) with a i being the initial cash outflow and c ti , t = 1, . . . , n the periodic cash flows during the project's life span of n periods. By P ⊂ R n+1 we denote the domain of possible projects at t = 0. All cash in-and outflows are received or issued directly by the principal. Agent and principal learn the initial investment a i of a realized project, but in t = 0 the expected cash flows E [c ti ] associated with a project P i are known only by the agent. Similarly to the models of Rogerson (1997) and Reichelstein (1997) , we assume that the cash flow in period t for project i is given by
where the noise terms ε ti are independently and identically distributed with reflects the temporal distribution of cash flows. As in Rogerson (1997) or Reichelstein (1997) we assume that the distributional parameters x ti are known to both parties, whereas y i is private information of the agent.
The owner's aim is to maximize the NPV of the investment portfolio. His ex ante expected utility equals the expected NPV of all realized projects:
with I(P i ) = 1, if project P i is undertaken and I(P i ) = 0 if P i is rejected.
The principal has a constant discount rate r P .
The agent has a utility function
which is (weakly) monotonically increasing in his wages w τ of all periods. We assume that the agent is more impatient than the principal. For instance, he uses a constant discount rate r A with r A > r P or principal and agent may have different planning horizons n A , n P with n A < n P . 3 We assume that the planning horizon of the principal exceeds the life span of the possible projects. r A and n A are hidden information to the principal. He only knows the fact that the agent is impatient but he doesn't know how impatient he is.
Both riskneutral parties sign a linear compensation contract. 4 The wage is assumed to be linear in a performance measure Π t and hence
with F t being a fixed amount in t, s t a premium rate and Π t the performance measure in t. The agent maximizes his utility and therefore he grounds his investment decision on the present value of his ex ante expected bonuses.
Additionally, we allow a transformation of cash flows into accruals, which has to be controllable by the principal. Accordingly, the transformation rule is based on realized cash flows. As we accept the assumption that an accounting system is able to transform a i and c ti separately for each project, we describe a general performance measure for a project i as follows:
The allocation rules α ti and β ti have to be designed to provide the desired incentives. For the performance of a whole period follows
In our analysis, the performance measure is determined by accruals. An accrual accounting system defines performance in each period by matching costs and benefits.
Residual income and relative benefit cost allocation schedule
In the main part of the recent literature it is assumed α ti ≡ 1, ∀i, t (Reichelstein, 1997; Rogerson, 1997) . That means, that all operative cash flows directly equal accruals, hence no "real" allocation rule between operative cash flows and accruals is used. Only the initial cash outflow a i is allocated by β ti over a project's life span. We now summarize the results obtained in this scenario and examine which "degree" of goal congruence can be obtained, if the only difference between a cash flow based performance measure and one based on accruals is the transformation of the investment cash outflow.
Weak Goal Congruence
In a world with a perfect capital market the principal's aim is to realize all projects with an expected positive net present value, that is, he wants the agent to undertake all projects with
In such an environment it is well known that residual income RI induces the right investment decision, because this performance measure fulfills the weak goal congruence property, i.e. the present value of the expected residual incomes equals the expected NPV of each project,
This property is also called conservation property of residual income and is well known in literature. Unless the agent has the same time preferences as the principal he realizes all projects with a positive expected NPV. Residual income is defined as profit minus an interest charge for the assets employed. If α t = 1 residual income is defined by
by operative cash flows, c ti , minus a depreciation charge, d ti · a i , and minus an interest charge for the book value of the assets employed, r P · B t−1,i . The depreciation schedule can be chosen freely as long as P n t=1 d ti = 1. Only the interest charge for the book value B t−1,i has to be accounted by r P ·B t−1,i . According to the familiar notion of "clean surplus accounting" we assume that the book value at the beginning of period t = 1 equals the investment cash outflow. The book value in the following periods is reduced by depreciation rates d ti , these rates determine the depreciation for a project i in period t. In accordance with the depreciation schedule the book value at the beginning of
Consequently, our allocation rule β ti in the performance measure equation (4) can be described by
Hence, it follows for our performance measure
That the conservation property holds for a single project was already proved by Preinreich (1937 Preinreich ( , 1938 or by Lücke (1955) . That this still holds for a set of projects is shown in Reichelstein (1997:163) :
This is still true for the expected values, because the expected values of the random variables equal zero. If principal and agent apply the same discount rate, the conservation property of residual income ensures weak goal congruence, provided that all bonus coefficients are identical, i.e. s t ≡ s. No restrictions are imposed on the depreciation schedule, except P n t=1 d ti = 1.
Strong Goal Congruence
In a more general case of an impatient agent, i.e. in the case of an higher discount rate of the agent r A ≥ r P or in the case of a shorter time horizon of the agent n A ≤ n P , weak goal congruence is not sufficient to introduce the desired investment decision. The present value of the bonus payments calculated by an impatient agent does not generally equal the NP V . Rogerson (1997:789-791 ) offers a solution for this scenario, the relative benefit cost allocation schedule. He designs a cost allocation β ti of the initial investment in a way that it takes into account the intertemporal allocation of cash flows.
The intuition behind this special allocation scheme is that costs are allocated according to the periodic returns. That means in periods with high returns (x ti high), high portions of the investment costs are allocated and in periods with low returns (x ti low), low costs are considered and if the return is zero in a period (x ti = 0) no investment costs are allocated. The resulting modified residual income is
The allocated periodic investment costs can be split into a depreciation and an interest charge (for example Reichelstein, 1997:168) , so that the performance measure is still a kind of residual income. Under the assumption of all distribution parameters being positive, it can be shown easily that for the relative benefit cost allocation schedule the expected residual income in each period of the life span is positive (negative), only if the expected NPV is positive (negative) (Reichelstein, 1997) :
Therefore, the manager has an incentive to invest in all projects with a positive expected NPV, even if he looks at just one period. In contrast to the case with identical discount rates and identical planning horizons of agent and principal, the depreciation schedule is now determined uniquely by the relative benefit cost allocation scheme. According to a positive contribution to the agent's utility in each period, the bonus coefficients can vary between periods if the expected NPV is positive,
To summarize these results, we list the properties of the performance measure residual income:
• If the allocation rule β ti is determined by
the performance measure equals residual income which ensures the conservation property. The present value of all residual incomes equals the NPV. Under the assumption P n t=1 d ti = 1 weak goal congruence is achieved.
• Residual income achieves strong goal congruence if the relative benefit cost allocation scheme, β ti =
, is used and if every distribution parameter is nonnegative, x ti ≥ 0. Hence, residual income is a positive multiple of the NPV in each period. Consequently, an impatient agent realizes all projects with an expected positive NPV, too.
These properties are achievable in the ex ante situation, which is the relevant view to induce the desired investment decision. So in a perfect capital market goal congruence between agent and principal is reachable because the agent has an incentive to realize all projects with an ex ante expected positive NPV.
Limits of the relative benefit cost allocation scheme
Now, we look at nearly the same situation, but we assume a limited budget, so that not all projects can be realized. To keep things simple, we consider a case with just two possible projects, i = 1, 2. Due to the limited budget, only one of them can be realized. Generally, in a case with a limited budget the principal wants the agent to maximize the expected NPV by his project selection. With regard to our simplification with only two possible projects, it is the principal's aim to realize the project with the higher (expected) NPV. Whether goal congruence is still achieved, depends on the cash flow structure of the two projects.
Proposition 1 Given x t1 = x t2 ,∀t, goal congruence is achieved. The agent selects the project with the higher expected NPV.
If x t1 = x t2 ,∀t, the same fraction of each E [NPV i ] , i = 1, 2, is reflected in every period. Thus, the agent selects the project with the higher expected NPV , whatever his time preference is.
If, however, x t1 6 = x t2 this is obviously no longer the case. It is instructive to consider an example (see Pfaff, 1999:67-68 for another example).
Example:
Each project requires an initial investment of 70,000. We assume that agent and principal have a discount rate of 10%. Project 2 Over the whole planning horizon of 5 periods project 1 has a higher E [NPV ]
than project 2. Namely, E [NPV 1 ] = 3, 658 is higher than E [NPV 2 ] = 3, 428. Assume the agent gains a fixed share of the residual incomes. If the planning horizon of the agent is shorter than 5 periods he will not decide according to NPV -maximization. Due to the fact that he is only interested in the present value of his expected bonuses he selects project 2 which has a lower expected NPV than project 1. For instance, if he only looks at the next 3 periods the present value of the expected residual incomes is 2,039 for project 1 and 2,515 for project 2. Thus he selects the second one. Only if his planning horizon is 5 periods he will select the NPV-maximizing project 1.
The same is true, if the agent uses a higher discount rate even though his planning horizon is longer than 5 periods. If his discount rate is at least 26% he will not choose project 1, because the E [NPV ] of project 1 is 2,440 and of project 2 is 2,441 for a discount rate of 26%.
From this counterexample we can conclude:
Proposition 2 In general, the relative benefit cost allocation scheme fails to achieve perfect goal congruence.
Evidently, an impatient agent does not in every case select the project with the highest expected NPV because he does not take into account the residual incomes of each period or he discounts them with a higher discount rate.
The relative benefit cost allocation scheme ensures that the expected performance measure has the same sign in each period as the expected NPV of each project, but it does not ensure that the same portion of each project's expected NPV is reflected in each period. Consequently, an incentive to choose the NPV-maximizing portfolio is not induced.
The present value of the agent's premiums of a project i is given by
if the premium rate is constant. With regard to the project selection out of the domain P, the factor P n t=1 x ti ·(1+r A ) −t P n τ =1 x τi ·(1+r P ) −τ shows that it is generally not true, that an impatient agent (with either a higher discount rate or a shorter time horizon 6 ) selects the same subset of profitable projects as the principal does, even if the premium rate is constant.
6 Then the factor equals
The above mentioned example demonstrates that in the case of a limited investment budget or in the case of competing projects the postulation of strong goal congruence in the sense of same signs of residual income and NPV in each period and for each project is not strong enough to induce the NPVmaximizing range of projects, if the agent is impatient. The application of both, residual income and the allocation rule relative benefit cost allocation scheme, is so far restricted to the selection of all projects with a positive expected NPV. However, the investment budget is often limited or you have to select between alternative projects. Hence, it is important to ask the question of whether a different way of constructing a performance measure can be found that induces the right choice of investment projects. 3 Perfect Goal Congruence
Definition
It is our aim to construct a perfect goal congruent performance measure under the same informational assumptions as in Reichelstein (1997 ) or Rogerson (1997 . This aim seems to be unreachable, as Reichelstein (1997:168-169) shows, that the relative benefit cost allocation schedule in (6) is the unique method for achieving goal congruence if the discount rate of the agent is unknown and higher than the principal's one. However, Reichelstein and
Rogerson solely regard a special kind of residual income in their analysis.
They both assume indirectly that α ti ≡ 1. Consequently all operative cash 7 Egginton (1995:213f) analyzes the "maintainable" residual income. He uses a depreciation charge that gives a constant ex ante residual income in each year of a project's life. But it provides periodic consistency only for projects of equal life, it cannot cope the ranking of unequal lives. The most critical point of his method is the information structure. To control the performance measure the principal has to know the NPV of a project. In that case, the principal could directly base the agent's premium on the NPV. in practice, we also find some reallocation rules for realized cash flows, for example provisions. Therefore, we will now show that the problem of project selection can be solved if we allow for a reallocation of operative cash flows.
We are able to find a performance measure that motivates the agent to select the NPV -maximizing set of projects.
We define perfect goal congruence as follows:
If the agent has to decide between alternative projects, a perfect goal congruent performance measure induces the right investment decision.
A class of perfect goal congruent performance measures
The definition of perfect goal congruence seems to be difficult to fulfill. In contrast to Reichelstein (1997) or Rogerson (1997) we consider the decision between projects and not the decision about separable projects. Our aim is to make the possible projects ex ante comparable in the performance measure of each period. In our model it would be sufficient, if the expected performance measure is a positive portion of the expected NPV, but the portion of the expected NPV has to be the same for all projects. Hence, we have obtained the following simple result:
with γ t > 0, ∀i, t, is achieved, perfect goal congruence as defined in the last section is obtained.
The factor γ t merely depends on the period index t and is independent of the project index i. 9 This means, that in period t, the same share γ t of each expected NPV equals the expected performance measure, E[Π ti ], of each possible project P i . 10 This must be true for every period. Hence, if we were able to construct a performance measure fulfilling this property, we would achieve a class of goal congruent performance measures.
We now demonstrate, that the principal indeed has enough information to
First, we transform equation (9) into:
9 Reichelstein (1997) and Rogerson (1997) 
This difference also illustrates why it is impossible to reach perfect goal congruence if only the initial cash outflow is allocated over time.
10 Also equation (8) induces, that the principal has to ensure the same portion of each expected NPV as performance measure in each period. The principal does not know the discount factor of the agent, so he can just ensure that xti P n τ =1 x τi ·(1+r P ) −τ is the same factor for each project in each period.
To assure that E[Π ti ] = γ t · E[NP V i ] for some vector of positive constants γ t , we have to show that there are values for α ti and β ti , such that the expected value of our performance measure defined in equation (4)
Therefore,
has to equal equation (10):
This is equivalent to Ã
Since y i and a i can vary for each possible project P i ∈ P, the two coefficients for y i and a i , the terms in brackets, have to be zero, in order for the left-hand side of (11) to be identically equal zero. Hence,
From these equations we can directly infer that a perfect goal congruent performance measure can be constructed as follows:
and
for an arbitrary vector of γ t . We call this class of allocation rules, (12) together with (13), "perfect" benefit cost allocation rules.
The principal ex ante knows the distribution of the expected cash flows. So he can setup an allocation rule α ti based on the distributional parameters and he can choose a parameter γ t > 0. Hence, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Perfect goal congruence is achieved, if the agent is rewarded on the basis of the performance measure,
x ti (1+r P ) t with γ t > 0, is used to reallocate operative cash flows into accruals and the allocation rule, β ti = γ t , is used to allocate the investment cost.
A perfect goal congruent investment decision is induced, because the agent bases his investment decision on his expected bonuses. Independently of the premium rate s t he maximizes his utility function, if he chooses the NPVmaximizing subset of projects.
In view of the fact that the performance measure should be a residual income ensuring that weak goal congruence still holds, we have to examine whether the conservation property holds. The following corollary shows that we can indeed find values for γ t such that this objective is obtained.
Corollary The perfect benefit cost allocation rule results in a residual income as a performance measure if and only if P n t=1 γ t (1+r P ) t = 1.
Thus, weak goal congruence is obtained.
An important issue is, that the premium rate can vary over time to ensure perfect goal congruence. The reason behind this result is, that the ranking of the projects in each period by the expected performance measure is the same as the ranking by NPV. It does not matter whether the premium rates vary between periods.
Annuity benefit cost allocation scheme
To compare projects over time, it is useful to ensure a constant expected performance measure for each project over it's entire life span. Then the same constant portion of a project's expected NPV is allocated over the entire life time of a project. If the performance measure is still a residual income such a constant expected value has to equal the expected annuity of a project according to the conservation property of the residual income concept. Consequently, the value of a project is equally allocated across all periods and the value contribution of each project is correctly reflected over the project's life span. The following allocation rule provides a solution to achieve this constant value contribution.
, ∀t, then the expected performance measures equals the expected annuity.
where A r P denotes the annuity factor,
For the expected performance measure follows:
with AN i as the annuity of project i.
q.e.d.
We call this allocation rule the annuity benefit cost allocation scheme.
Perfect goal congruence is achieved in this special case of the annuity benefit cost allocation scheme because the expected performance of each project in each period equals the expected annuity of a project. In the case of two projects having the same expected NPV, the agent will be indifferent because both expected performance measures are equal in each period. In the case of projects with different expected NPV, the expected bonus of a more profitable project is higher than that of a less profitable one. It follows, that the agent has an incentive to select the set of NPV -maximizing projects independently of his time preference.
The designed performance measure is a residual income, because the conservation property still holds. The allocation of the investment costs can be separated into a depreciation charge and an interest charge for the book value. The depreciation schedule is uniquely fixed by the investment allocation rule β ti . Strong goal congruence is also reached, because every perfect goal congruent performance measure has the property of strong goal congruence, too.
The annuity of a project reflects the profitability of a project in each period, because it is a uniform distribution of the NPV over a project's life span.
To calculate this figure or its expectation, you normally use the NPV resp. E[NP V ] and the annuity factor. Accordingly, it seems to be impossible to create such an annuity performance measure without having all information about a project. For example, one might think that the principal ex ante needs to know all expected cash flows of a project to induce the right incentives. He can do this, however, even though he has not all this information, because it is sufficient to have the information about the distribution para-meters. It is not necessary to know the profitability parameters. It follows that we donot have to change the information structure, it remains the same as in Reichelstein or Rogerson. 3.4 Application in an accounting system So far the principal is able to calculate the perfect or the annuity benefit cost allocation scheme. Thus, he has to instruct the transformation of the original distributional parameters of the cash flows into the distributional parameters of the accruals.
11 In our model we have found a solution, but how can it be used in practice? Residual income is a measure usually calculated in an accounting system. 12 Therefore we now "translate" our allocation rule into "accounting terms".
By using periodic shifts of the original cash flows, we can obtain the desired distribution of accruals. To illustrate the annuity benefit cost allocation rule we construct an annuity distribution. We have a look at the following original cash flow distribution (x 1i , x 2i , . . . , x ki , . . . , x k+l,i , . . . , x ni ) of a single project.
We assume that all distributional parameters equal the annuity distribution
except x ki and x k+l,i . Therefore, one of the two parameters is less than x Ai and the other one is higher than x Ai .
If in period k the original distributional parameter is less than x Ai we can "transfer" cash flows which originally belong the period k + l to period k.
That means that the recognition of these cash flows in the accounting system occurs in an earlier period than their realization. In this case we have to consider an interest effect. Assume we need ξ · x k+l,i , 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1, in k to reach x Ai . In period k the distributional parameter is calculated by x ki + ξ · x k+l,i = x Ai . Then in period k + l we have to subtract ξ · x k+l,i · (1 + r P ) l because of the interest effect between these two dates.
In the opposite case, i.e. in period k + l the original distributional parameter is less than x Ai , we "shift" cash flows from period k to a future period k + l.
Then the recognition in the accounting system is later than the realization of the cash flows. Hence, in k we need to reserve the present value of the necessary amount. For example, we need
Generally, it is possible to construct an annuity distributional vector x Ai by using period shifts between multiple periods. If, for example, the surplus over x Ai in a former period is not high enough in a single period to add up x ti to x Ai , shifts over more than one period are possible:
In accounting terms this equals the release of provisions. In former periods the provisions are built up. Contrary, in the case of high returns in the current period, x τi > x Ai we can use
allocating the surplus of period τ reasonably over the following periods with distributional parameters less than x Ai . In accounting terms, this is booking provisions. With opposite signs these periodic shifts can be interpreted as the booking of receivables and their release. This can be phrased as follows:
If in an early period the distributional parameter is higher than x Ai , we can build up provisions and release them in periods with an original distributional parameter less than x Ai . In the case of a distributional parameter less than x Ai we can enter receivables in the books, which are released in later periods with higher expected returns. This shows, that in an accounting system our allocation rule can be established by the principal. Importantly, but contrary to general use in practice, the periodic shifts have to heed the timing effect, i.e. they have to take into account the (imputed) interests. Since we pay attention to these interest yields, the present value of the original and the modified distributional parameters is still the same. The conservation property still holds.
13
At this point it is obvious why we do not need the assumptions that x ti > 0 which has be to imposed by previous models. In these models only the allocation of the investment cash outflow is considered. Here, we allow for the allocation of the operative cash flows, too. Hence, if the present value of the distributional parameters of a project is positive, there exists an allocation rule for the investment costs and the operative cash flows, so that the distributional parameters of the corresponding accruals are all positive. Therefore, 13 For a detailed proof in a similar context, see Mohnen (2002:148f). it is not necessary anymore to assume positive original distributional parameters of the cash flows.
Conclusion
In situations with a limited budget or alternative projects, the principal wants the agent to select the NPV -maximizing investment portfolio. In these situations the residual income in combination with the relative benefit cost allocation scheme does not induce the same project ranking as NPV. Here, we have shown that by using a special transformation of the cash flows into accruals, the ex ante expected residual income equals the expected annuity in each period. The agent selects the NPV -maximizing set of projects, because the expected residual incomes of different projects reflect the ex ante NPVranking of the projects, even if just one period is considered. It is sufficient to look at this performance measures to rank projects.
We obtain the annuity residual income by an allocation scheme which we call annuity benefit cost allocation rule. This rule transforms the cash flows into "annuity accruals" by using periodic shifts. The applied periodic shifts can be interpreted as accounting methods used in practice. There it is common use to set up provisions and to use receivables, generally to smooth earnings over several periods. In financial accounting these methods are restricted by law, but in managerial accounting they are not.
Concerning the information structure, it is good news, that we can use the same model setup as seminal papers like Reichelstein (1997 ) or Rogerson (1997 . The principal needs only information about the distributional parameters of the operative cash flows. Ex ante this information is enough to ensure a perfect goal congruent performance measure. The rational behind this is, that it is sufficient to transform the distributional parameters into a perfect, particularly into an annuity allocation. Then the agent has an incentive to select the NPV -maximizing projects no matter what his time preferences are.
As a further result, we have shown, that the premium rate can vary over time because in each period the agent enhances his utility by selecting the NPV -maximizing portfolio of projects.
In practice our result may seem a bit difficult to implement. However, income smoothing is well established and here we do not use it for financial reporting, but only for managerial control and performance payment purposes. Moreover, the annuity performance measure may be a solution to derive rules to handle the so called "EVA-Bonusbank". 
